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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Veronica Lynn Calver appeals from her conviction for felony custodial
interference.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Veronica Lynn Calver married Raymond Calver in 2005 in Las Vegas.
(12/20/11 Tr., p.146, L.13 - p.149, L.7.) Their son, R.C., was born in December
2008. (12/20/11 Tr., p.149, Ls.10-14.) The Calvers moved to Boise in 2009.
(12/20/11 Tr., p.156, Ls.6-7.)

At some point prior to July 2011, the Calvers

began discussing moving to Tennessee to be closer to Veronica's family.
(12/20/11 Tr., p.35, Ls.5-24; p.177, L.23 -

p.180, L.3.)

However, the

relationship deteriorated and Calver kicked Raymond out of their house in July
2011. (12/20/11 Tr., p.25, L.11-p.28, L.18; p.176, L.7-p.177, L.22.)
At some point after this separation, Calver informed Raymond that she
intended to move to Tennessee with R.C. and her two children from a previous
relationship. (12/20/11 Tr., p.37, L.18-p.38, L.16; p.180, LA-p.188, L.1.) In
August 2011, Raymond filed for divorce. (12/20/11 Tr., p.34, L.8-16; p.37, L.20
- p.38, L.16.)

The Ada County magistrate court entered a joint temporary

restraining order. (State's exhibit 1.) The order, among other things, prohibited
both Raymond and Calver from U[r]emoving any minor child of the parties who
reside in Idaho from the State of Idaho (except for periods of time not exceeding
72 hours)" without specific written consent of the parties or by order of the court.
(Id.)

Raymond employed his brother Forrest to serve the order and other
1

divorce papers on Calver on August 30, 2011. (12/19/11 Tr., p.147, L.9 - p.152,
L. 7; 12/20/11 Tr., p.34, L.8 - p.35, L.4; State's exhibit 2.)
Shortly thereafter, without Raymond's consent, Calver took RCo and her
other two children and left Idaho. (12/20/11 Tr., p.42, L.12 - p.46, L.5; p.196,
L.19 - p.198, L.20.) However, Calver's vehicle broke down in Tremonton, Utah.
(12/20/11 Tr., p.199, Ls.5-13.) At the scene of the breakdown, Calver had a
panic attack, and was transported to a local hospital. (12/20/11 Tr., p.200, L.2 p.201, L.16.)
Meanwhile, Raymond contacted law enforcement when he realized
Calver and RC. had moved out of their Boise apartment. (12/20/11 Tr., p.42,
L.12 - p.43, L.24.)

Raymond informed Officer Kristopher Olsen that he

suspected Calver had taken the children out of state.

(12/19/11 Tr., p.123,

Ls.10-21.) Officer Olsen contacted Calver's mother in Tennessee and informed
her that he was trying to get in touch with Calver. (12/19/11 Tr., p.124, Ls.1-22.)
Calver then contacted Officer Olsen from Utah.
L.17 - p.130, L.2; State's exhibit 3.)

(12/19/11 Tr., p.124,

During this conversation, Officer Olsen

discussed the joint temporary restraining order, which Calver denied that she
had been legally served. (State's exhibit 3.) Officer Olsen told Calver that if she
did not return RC. to the state she may be subject to prosecution for felony
custodial interference. (ld.,6:53-7:16.) Calver asserted that someone from the
police department, who happened to be nearby at the time of Forrest's service
of the order and divorce papers, had informed her that Forrest's attempted
service was not legal. (Id., 7:17 - 7:40.) Calver continued that she believed that
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due to this "loophole," she could take RC. to Tennessee. (ld.) Calver indicated
that she took the children out of state due to Raymond's drug use and violent
behavior, and because of a recent incident during which she alleged Raymond
"dared" her older son to cross a dangerous river during a camping trip. (State's
exhibit 3; see also 12/20/11 Tr., p.161, L.9 - p.173, L.9.)
Calver, still in Utah, then spoke with Garden City police officer John
Brumbaugh. (12/20/11 Tr., p.90, L.10 - p.92, L.15; state's exhibit 4.) Officer
Brumbaugh informed Calver that he could seek a felony arrest warrant for
custodial interference if Calver did not return to Idaho with R.C. (State's exhibit
4, 13:11 - 15:32.)

Officer Brumbaugh also faxed copies of the divorce

documents, including the joint temporary restraining order, to Calver in Utah.
(12/20/11 Tr., p.92, L.20 - p.93, L.16.) A short time later, Calver's parents came
to Utah and took Calver and the children to Tennessee, where they arrived
around September 15 or 16, 2011. (12/20/11, p.209, L.11- p.210, L.21.)
The state charged Calver with felony custodial interference. (R, pp.2930.)

Calver was arrested in Tennessee on September 26, 2011, and

transported back to Idaho.

(R, pp.9-11; 12/20/11 Tr., p.219, L.16 - p.220,

L.10.) At trial, Calver primarily employed a necessity defense, arguing that she
had to take RC. and her other children from Idaho to protect them from
Raymond's alteged violent behavior and drug use. (12/20/11 Tr., p.273, L.24 p.287, L.19.)

The jury found Calver guilty of felony custodial interference.

(12/20/11 Tr., p.291, L.18 - p.292, L.1.) The district court imposed a unified

sentence of five years with one year fixed, but suspended the sentence and
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placed Calver on probation for five years.
appealed. (R., pp.98-100.)
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(R., pp.91-97.)

Calver timely

ISSUES
Calver states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Should this Court vacate Ms. Calver's conviction for
custodial interference as the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence that Ms. Calver was "without lawful authority" to
take, keep or withhold R.C. from Raymond Calver?

2.

Was Ms. Calver's right to due process of law violated by the
district court erroneously instructing the jury that Ms. Calver
could be convicted of child custody interference on the
findings of facts necessary to support a guilty verdict?

3.

Does there exist a fatal variance between the Information
and the jury instructions, as the jury instructions advised that
Raymond Calver's custodial rights could arise either from a
custodial order, as alleged in the Information, or from his
equal custodial rights as a parent, which was not alleged in
the Information?

(Appellant's brief, p.?)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Calver failed to show that the evidence of her guilt presented at trial
was insufficient to support her conviction?

2.

Has Calver failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions?

3.

Has Calver failed to show fundamental error entitling her to appellate
review of her unpreserved variance claim?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The Evidence Of Calver's Guilt Presented At Trial Was Sufficient To Support
Her Conviction For Felony Custodial Interference

A.

Introduction
Calver contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

support her conviction for felony custodial interference. (Appellant's brief, pp.816.)

Specifically, she contends that the state failed to present sufficient

evidence either that she "acted without lawful authority," or that Raymond Calver
possessed adequate custodial rights to have been unlawfully deprived of R.C.
(ld.)

However, a review of the record reveals that the state presented

substantial competent evidence from which the jury could conclude that Calver
was guilty of felony custodial interference.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered

upon a verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288,292,955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997);
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting
this review, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the finder of
fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at
292,955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App.
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1991); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).
Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed
in favor of upholding the verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart,
112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072.

C.

The Evidence Was Sufficient To Support Calver's Conviction
Idaho Code § 18-4506 defines felony child custody interference, in

relevant part, as follows:
1.

A person commits child custody interference if the person,
whether a parent or other, or agent of that person,
intentionally and without lawful authority:
(a)

2.

Takes, entices away, keeps or withholds any minor
child from a parent or another person or institution
having custody, joint custody, visitation or other
parental rights, whether such rights arise from [sic]
temporary or permanent custody order, or from the
equal custodial rights of each parent in the absence
of a custody order[.]

It shall be an affirmative defense to a violation of the
provisions of subsection 1. of this section that:
(a)

The action is taken to protect the child from imminent
physical harm;

(b)

The action is taken by a parent fleeing from imminent
physical harm to himself[.]

Relevant to this case, in order for a jury to find a defendant guilty of
felony custodial interference, the state must prove that the taking or keeping
from was conducted "without lawful authority." I.C. § 18-4506(a). The- nature of
this element varies based on the characterization of the defendant in a particular
case. Where the defendant is not a parent or legal custodian of the child, and
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where there is no consent from the child's parent or legal guardian for the
defined act or omission, the lack of lawful authority would be readily apparent.
However, as Calver points out on appeal (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10; p.14 n.11),
a parent, generally, has fundamental constitutional rights regarding their actions
and omissions as they relate to raising their children. See Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S 390 (1923). However, a lawfully entered custodial court order can limit
a parent's custodial rights, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944), and a parent who violates such an order through a defined act or
omission would be doing so "without lawful authority" in violation of I.C. § 184506(a).
The state also must prove that the defendant's action or omission
deprived the child from an individual who actually had some type of custodial
right over the child.

I.C. § 18-4506(a). A person has not violated I.C. § 18-

4506(a), for example, if she has only deprived the child from an individual, such
as a parent who has had his or her custodial rights revoked by a court or who
lacks adequate custodial rights regarding the child. In other words, this element
requires that there be a qualified victim of the act or omission of the defendant.
Idaho Code § 18-4506(a) broadly requires this victim to be either a parent, other
individual, or institution that has "custody, joint custody, visitation or other
parental rights" over the child.
On appeal, Calver contends that the state failed to present sufficient
evidence either that her act or omission in taking, keeping, or withholdiog R.C.
was done "without lawful authority," or that Raymond was a qualified victim that
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had adequate custodial rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-16.) However, the record
reveals that the state presented substantial competent evidence from which the
jury could conclude that the state proved both of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.
At trial, the state presented substantial evidence from which the jury
could find that Calver "lacked lawful authority" to take and keep R.C. out-of-state
because she knowingly violated the joint temporary restraining order which
prohibited both her and Raymond from taking R.C. out of state for more than 72
hours without written consent. The joint temporary restraining order itself was
entered into evidence. (12/19/11 Tr., p.126, L.5 - p.127, L.5; state's exhibit 1.)
Raymond's brother, Forrest, testified that he served the order and other relevant
divorce papers on Calver. (12/19/11 Tr., p.147, L.13 - p.152, L.7.) Specifically,
Forrest testified that he personally handed the papers to Calver, who responded
to the service by stating that "she would destroy [the papers] or something to
that effect." (12/19/11 Tr., p.150, Ls.1-24.) Forrest further testified that as he
left, Calver "was looking at the papers," and told him "she would destroy
[Raymond Calver] and she would destroy [Forrest] too." (12/19/11 Tr., p.150,
L.24 - p.151, L.5.) Forrest left the papers with Calver, and then left to have his
affidavit of service notarized.
exhibit 2.)

(12/19/11 Tr., p.151, L.21 - p.152, L.7; state's

This affidavit was admitted into evidence at trial.

(12/19/11 Tr.,

p.147, L.16 - p.149, L.6; state's exhibit 2.)
A jury could further reasonably infer from Calver's subsequent actions,
statements, and trial testimony that Calver knew of the custody order prior to
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leaving Idaho.

Shortly after Forrest's service of the divorce papers, Calver,

without Raymond's consent, took R.C. and her other two children and left Idaho.
(12/20/11 Tr., p.42, L.12 - p.46, L.5; p.196, L.19 - p.198, L.16.)

In her

interview with Officer Olsen, conducted while she was in Utah, Calver contested
the legality of Forrest's service, and stated that she believed a "loophole"
permitted her to take RC. to Tennessee.

(State's exhibit 3.) The jury could

have reasonably inferred from this interview that Calver, though aware of the
terms of the temporary joint custody order, believed it did not apply to her
because the civil service of the documents was somehow deficient.

Further,

while Calver contended that she never looked at the divorce papers and
temporary joint restraining order, she acknowledged at trial that she "knew [the
order] would have to do with [RC.] [She] figured it was going to be a restraining
order because just by what Forrest had said." (12/20/11 Tr., p.192, Ls.16-23.)
The testimony of Forrest and Calver, Officer Olsen's recorded interview of
Calver, the temporary joint restraining order and associated affidavit of service,
and Calver's actions in leaving the state and then continuing on to Tennessee,
constituted sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found that Calver
knowingly violated the temporary joint restraining order prior to leaving Idaho,
and thus deprived Raymond of RC. "without lawful authority."
In addition, the state presented substantial evidence sufficient to show
that Raymond Calver had adequate custodial rights over RC. to implicate I.C. §
18-4506(a). It was undisputed at trial that

Raymon~

was R.C.'s father, that until

July 2011 he had custody over R.C. and lived with R.C and Veronica, and that
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prior to the divorce filing, there were no court orders in place that impacted his
custody of RC.

(12/20/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-17; p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.5; p.149,

Ls.8-14). Raymond was therefore clearly a qualified victim under the provisions
of I.C. § 18-4506(a).
On appeal, Calver incorrectly interprets these elements of I.C. § 18-4506
as requiring something beyond what is indicated by the plain language of that
statute. She asserts:
The only limitation on Ms. Calver's right to parent in this case
was the JTRO issued by a magistrate court when Mr. Calver filed
for divorce. As such, the State could not convict Ms. Calver of
custodial interference absent proof both that she violated specific
terms of [the] JTRO, and that the JTRO granted Mr. Calver the very
custodial rights Ms. Calver was alleged to have interfered with.
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) Calver further argues:
While there is ample evidence Ms. Calver took, kept or
withheld R C. from Mr. Calver, there is no evidence she lacked
lawful authority to do so. The plain language of the JTRO does not
prohibit Ms. Calver from doing any of those actions. The plain
language does not establish Mr. Calver has any right to actual
physical custody of RC., let alone the right to personally visit with
him. At best, the JTRO establishes that Ms. Calver's lawful
authority to make decisions regarding R.C.'s custody, care, and
nurture, is limited by not allowing her to "remove" him from the
State of Idaho for more than 72 hours. Simultaneously, this clause
could be read to establish Mr. Calver has an interest in RC. being
somewhere in the State of Idaho for periods up to 72 hours.
However, the right to preclude the mother of your child from taking
your child outside of the State for more than 72 hours, does not
establish a right to have physical custody of the child. Ms. Calver
was not charged with taking RC. outside of Idaho for more than 72
hours - she was charged with taking, keeping or withholding R.C.
from Raymond Calver who has "joint custody or other parental
rights arising from" the JTRO.
(Appellant's brief, p.15.)
While it may be debatable whether the state could convict Calver, or any
11

parent, of custodial interference absent proof that she violated specific terms of
a custodial order, 1 I.C. § 18-4506 simply did not require the state to prove that
the order in this case specifically "granted Raymond Calver the very custodial
rights Ms. Calver was alleged to have interfered with," or that the order
specifically granted Raymond Calver any rights at all. Instead, this element of
the crime simply required the state to prove that Calver kept or withheld R.C.
from a qualified victim who had custodial rights over R.C.

Indeed, the joint

temporary restraining order did not grant custodial rights to either parent; it
instead limited the otherwise fundamental custodial rights of both individuals.
The state presented substantial evidence at trial to show both that Calver
violated that order and thus acted "without lawful authority" in taking and
keeping R.C. out of state, and also that she violated Raymond's rights by doing
so.
Because the state presented substantial evidence at trial sufficient for the
jury to find that Calver committed felony custodial interference, the jury's verdict,
and Calver's judgment of conviction, should be affirmed.

II.
Calver Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions

A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Calver argues that the district court erred by

1 The state does not concede the validity of Calver's suggestion that a parent
may never be constitutionally prosecuted under I.C. § 18-4506 for permanently
removing a child from Idaho without the consent of the other parent where both
parents have equal custodial rights and neither have express court-ordered
restrictions against such out-of-state relocation.
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failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of felony custodial
interference. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-28.) However, a review of the relevant
instruction reveals that Calver has failed to show error, let alone fundamental
error, that would necessitate reversal of his conviction.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,587,261
P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147,233 P.3d 71, 78
(2010); State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002).

"An

erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions
as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261
P.3d at 865 (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,373-74,247 P.3d 582,
600-01 (2010)).

C.

Calver Has Failed To Carry Her Burden Of Establishing Fundamental
Error With Respect To Her Claim Of Instructional Error
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
This same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions.

See I.C.R.

30(b) ("No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction
unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,
stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the
objection."). Absent a timely objection, the
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app~IIate

courts of this state will only

review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209,227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Calver to
demonstrate the error she alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this three-prong test to
Calver's claim of instructional error shows that she has failed to demonstrate
fundamental error.
In this case, jury instruction No.1 0 provided:
In order for the defendant, Veronica L. Calver, to be guilty of
Child Custody Interference, the state must prove each of the
following:
1.

On or between September 8,2011 and October 10,2011

2.

the defendant, Veronica L. Calver, intentionally

3.

and without lawful authority

4.

took and/or kept and/or withheld

5.

a child under the age of 18 years

6.

from Raymond Calver who had the right to custody and/or
other parental rights arising from a temporary restraining
order regarding the child in CV-OR-2011-16503,

7.

where the defendant, with knowledge of the order, took the
child out of state and/or did not voluntarily return the child
unharmed.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of
14

the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty.
The "right to custody" includes custody, joint custody,
visitation, or other parental rights, whether such rights arise from a
temporary or permanent custody order or from the equal custodial
rights of each parent in the absence of a custody order.
It is not "without lawful authority" to take and/or keep and/or
withhold a child if such action is taken to protect the child from
imminent physical harm and/or such an action is taken by a parent
fleeing from imminent physical harm to such parent.
(R, p.80.)

This instruction closely resembles approved Idaho pattern jury

instruction ICJI 1240.
For the first time on appeal, Calver alleges that this instruction was
erroneous because it allowed the jury to find her guilty if it found she "kept
and/or withheld" RC. from Raymond Calver, as an alternative to finding she
"took" RC from Raymond.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-28.) Calver also asserts

that the instruction should have more specifically defined the concept of "lawful
authority" to clarify that she had fundamental custodial rights, qualified only by
the joint temporary restraining order. (ld.) Calver's argument fails because she
has failed to establish fundamental error.
The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Calver to
demonstrate a constitutional violation.
978.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at

Calver has failed to show that her constitutional rights were violated

because the instructions, as a whole, do not misstate the law or permit the jury
to convict Calver for legal conduct.
Calver contends that the instructions permitted the jury to conviat her for
legal conduct.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-28.)
15

Specifically, she asserts that

because the joint temporary restraining order only prohibited her from "taking"
R.C. out of state for more than 72 hours, the instructions were erroneous
because they permitted the jury to find her guilty if they found that she merely
"kept and/or withheld" R.C. from Mr. Carver. (ld.)
However, reviewing the instructions as a whole reveals that the "kept
and/or withheld" language in instruction no. 10 was, at worst, unnecessary and
irrelevant to the jury's determination.

Its inclusion does not amount to a

constitutional violation. Regardless of whether the jury found that Calver took,
kept, or withheld R.C. from Raymond, it was also required to find that Calver
committed such an act or omission "without lawful authority."

(R., p.80.)

Calver's custodial authority was only addressed in two ways at trial - one, in
terms of the limitations placed on it by the joint temporary restraining order
(which prevented her from "taking" R.C. out of the state), and two, as part of her
necessity defense in that Calver contended that she was not "without lawful
authority" to act because she was doing so to protect R.C. and herself from
imminent physical harm. There was no basis for the jury to find that Calver
"kept and/or withheld" R.C. "without lawful authority," and thus, there is no bas'is
for concluding that the jury could have convicted Calver based on legal conduct.
Thus, while the "kept and/or withheld" language was unnecessary and irrelevant
to the jury's determination, it did not violate Calver's constitutional rights.
Calver has also failed to show that her constitutional rights were violated
by the jury instruction's failure to more specifically define "lawful authority." The
pattern jury instruction for custodial interference, ICJI 1240, does not define
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"lawful authority" other than through its instruction that it is not without lawful
authority to take, entice away, keep, or withhold a child if such action is taken
either to protect the child or a parent fleeing from imminent physical harm. The
pattern ICJI instructions are presumptively correct. State v. Cuevas-Hernandez,
140 Idaho 373, 376, 92 P.3d 704, 707 (Ct. App. 2004).

While the jury

instructions in the present case did not precisely follow ICJI 1240, they did
include the explanation of "lawful authority" that actually appears in ICJI 1240
and I.C. § 18-4506 - that it is not without lawful authority to take, entice away,
keep, or withhold a child if such action is taken either to protect the child or a
parent fleeing from imminent physical harm. Calver has failed to show that that
the district court violated her constitutional rights by not further defining "lawful
authority" beyond how it is defined in ICJI1240 and I.C. § 18-4506.
Read in its totality, the challenged jury instruction correctly instructed the
jury. The instruction did not omit any of the crime's essential elements, nor did it
relieve the state of its duty to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt
or permit it to convict Calver for legal conduct. Calver has therefore failed to
meet her burden to show constitutional error, and has failed to satisfy the first
prong of the Perry fundamental error analysis.
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978
(footnote omitted). Calver cannot satisfy this element because, for the reasons
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discussed above, she cannot show clear error. Further, she cannot show that
the decision of her trial counsel to not object to the jury instructions was based
on ignorance of the law or other objective shortcomings, as opposed to being
merely a tactical decision.
If Calver's counsel determined, based on the factors discussed above
and the fact that Calver utilized a necessity defense at trial, that the possibility of
the jury convicting her based on legal contact was extremely remote, counsel
may have chosen to leave any minor instructional error intact for potential
appellate reversal should Calver be convicted.

This type of scenario does

create the incentive to "sandbag," a tactic the fundamental error standard seeks
to prevent.

Jii., 150 Idaho at 224,245 P.3d at 976.

On appeal, Calver appears to attempt to challenge the validity of the
second prong of Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court's concern for "sandbagging,"
and the burden placed on defendants to show harm from unobjected-to errors.
Specifically, Calver suggests that if the appellate court were to assume that a
defense counsel would knowingly fail to object to error for tactical reasons in a
given situation, it must also assume that the prosecutor knowingly failed to
correct the error (and thus likely committed misconduct), and that the district
court gave instructions knowing it was violating the defendant's constitutional
rights (and was thus "unfit for the bench") (Appellant's brief, pp.23-26.)
However, contrary to Calver's suggestion, the second prong of the Perry
fundamental error test does not affirmatively "assume" anything about a defense
attorney's intentions or lack thereof in failing to object to error. Instead, this test
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seeks to discourage or prevent "sandbagging," not penalize it after it is
affirmatively proven to have occurred. See Perry 150 Idaho at 224, 224 P.3d at
976 ("[R]equiring a contemporaneous objection prevents the litigant from
sandbagging the court, i.e., 'remaining silent about his objection and belatedly
raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor.'" (citations
omitted)). To that end, a defendant fails to meet the second prong of Perry if
there is merely a "reasonable possibility" defense counsel's failure to object was
tactical.

~

at 229, 224 P.3d at 981. Calver is not, as she appears to suggest,

entitled to a presumption that her counsel's decision was not tactical, particularly
where, as here, there was a reasonable basis for not objecting.

If Calver

believes that her counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object, she
may pursue post-conviction relief.

There, "additional fact-finding may be

conducted to determine the motivation for defense counsel's failure to object."

The third and final element of a claim of fundamental error requires
Calver to "demonstrate that the error affected [her] substantial rights, meaning
i

(in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Calver has failed to
show that if the jury instructions omitted the "kept and/or withheld" language,
and further defined "lawful authority" to clarify the existence of Calver's
fundamental custodial rights, that the jury would have acquitted her of felony
custodial interference. Calver's primary defense at trial was one of necessity,
that she had to take R.C. and her other children from Idaho to protect them from
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Raymond's alleged violent behavior and drug use. (12/20/11 Tr., p.273, L.24 p.287, L.19.) The state's case centered around Calver's intentional violation of
the joint temporary restraining order. (12/20/11 Tr., p.261, L.12 - p.273, L.22.)
In order for the error Calver asserts to have changed the jury's verdict, the jury
would have had to take a different course, rejected the state's contention that
Calver "took" R.C. out of state from Raymond in violation of the joint temporary
restraining order, but still convicted her for "keeping andlor withholding" him
from Calver. In addition, the jury would have had to have found that the state
proved that Calver acted "without lawful authority" by some unexplained means
other than a violation of the joint temporary restraining order.

Such a

circumstance of events is unlikely. It is exceedingly more likely, under the facts
of this case, that the jury simply found that Calver violated the joint temporary
restraining order, and rejected Calver's affirmative defense that there was
imminent harm to R.C. or herself which justified the violation.
Calver has failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions and,
as such, has failed to show any basis for reversal of her conviction.

III.
Calver Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Her To Appellate
Review Of Her Unpreserved Variance Claim

A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Calver argues that there was a fatal variance

between the jury instructions and the charging Information. (Appellant's brief,
pp.29-33.)

This Court must decline to review Calver's unpreserved variance

claim because she has failed to demonstrate from the record that the
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complained of variance rises to the level of fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether there is a variance between a charging document and the jury

instructions at trial, and whether such variance is fatal to the conviction, are
questions of law given free review on appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56,
57,951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Because Calver Failed To Object Below, Her Claim Of A Variance Has
Not Been Preserved For Appeal, And She Has Failed To Show
Fundamental Error
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts

different from those alleged in the indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S.
100, 105 (1979). A variance also occurs where the jury instructions given at trial
allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more
alternative theories than alleged in the charging d?cument.

See,~,

State v.

Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho
160, 166,90 P.3d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004).
If it is established that a variance exists, the appellate court must
examine whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the
conviction. See State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329, 33 P.3d 218, 220 (Ct. App.
2001).

A variance is fatal if it amounts to a "constructive amendment" or

"deprives the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of
double jeopardy." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App.
2003);

State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 479, 272 P.3d 417, 451 (2012)
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(quoting Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18, 716 P .2d at 1189-90; State v. Wolfrum,
145 Idaho 44, 47, 175 P.3d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 2007)).

A constructive

amendment occurs if a variance alters the charging document to the extent the
defendant is tried for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature. Jones,
140 Idaho at 49, 89 P.3d at 889; State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566, 871 P.2d
1225,1231 (Ct.App.1993).
In addition, as discussed above, where, as here, the defendant did not
object to the alleged error below, he has the burden of demonstrating
fundamental error in order to obtain relief and satisfying the three prongs of the
Perry fundamental error test.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226-228, 245 P.3d at 978-

980.
For the first time on appeal, Calver contends that a fatal variance existed
in this case because the charging information "alleged Raymond Calver's
custodial or parental rights stem directly from the JTRO, not from anywhere
else," but the jury instructions stated that Raymond's custodial or other parental
rights arise either from the joint temporary restraining order or his "equal
custodial rights." (Appellant's brief, pp.29-33.)
Calver concedes she did not preserve her variance claim by way of a
timely objection below, but argues she is nevertheless entitled to review of this
claim and, ultimately, to relief thereon because the error is fundamental.
(Appellant's brief, pp.29-33.) However application of this test to the facts of this
case shows Calver has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that the
variance she claims rises to the level of fundamental error.
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The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Calver to
demonstrate a constitutional violation.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at

978. Calver appears to argue she has satisfied this step in the analysis merely
by claiming a variance between the charging document and the jury instructions
because such claim necessarily implicates her due process rights. (Appellant's
brief, pp.30-31.) Calver is mistaken. Although an actual variance between the
instructions and the allegations of a charging document implicates due
process,

~,

State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 891, 893, 673 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Ct.

App. 1983), no due process violation actually occurs unless the variance affects
the defendant's substantial rights by either "depriv[ing] the defendant of his right
to fair notice or leav[ing] him open to the risk of double jeopardy," State v.
Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165, 90 P.3d 910, 915 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v.
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 716 P.2d 1182, 1189-90 (1985) (footnote
omitted)).
Calver has failed to satisfy the first prong of Perry because she has failed
to demonstrate a variance, let alone a fatal variance. As discussed above, I.C.

§ 18-4506(a) requires that there be a qualified victim of the defendant's actions
or omissions regarding the child.

This victim may be either a parent of the

child, some other person, or institution that has "custody, joint custody, visitation
or other parental rights" over the child.

I.C. § 18-4506(a).

Relative to this

element, the Information in this case alleged that Calver deprived Raymond,
"who has joint custody and/or other parental rights arising from [sic] temporary
restraining order regarding the child in CV-DR-2011-16503." (R., p.30.) Thus,
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the information alleged that Raymond was a qualified victim pursuant to I.C. §
18-4506(a), and that his custodial authority came from: (1) his joint custody,
and/or (2) other parental rights arising from the temporary restraining order
regarding the child in CV-DR-2001-16503? Contrary to Calver's suggestion on
appeal, the information thus did not allege that Raymond's custodial authority
came "directly from the JTRO, [and] not from anywhere else."
Further, the jury instruction, with regard to this element, required the jury
to find that Raymond "had the right to custody and/or other parental rights
arising from a temporary restraining order regarding the child in CV-DR-201116503." (R., p.80.) The jury instruction further clarified, "the right to custody
includes custody, joint custody, visitation, or other parental rights, whether such
rights arose from a temporary or permanent custody order or from the equal
custodial rights of each parent in the absence of a custody order."

(MJ

There is no variance in this case. Although the statute, Information, and
jury instruction each utilized slightly different language in addressing this
element of the crime, they all discussed it in functionally similar terms that did
not allow the jury to convict Calver for conduct not alleged in the Information.

The state recognizes that Calver would construe the Information as instead
alleging that Raymond Calver had "joint custody and/or other parental rights,"
either of which arose from, and exclusively from, "the temporary restraining
order." While this is perhaps a plausible construction, it is a less than
persuasive one because I.C. § 18-4506(a) does not require that the victim's
custodial rights come from a court order. By the language of I.C. § 18-4506(a),
"custody, joint custody, visitation or other parental rights" is enough to establish
a "qualified victim," and those rights can come from custody orders, or simply
from the equal custodial rights of each parent. In any event, Calver can hardly
meet her burden to show "clear" fundamental error where there is such possible
ambiguity.
2
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The Information put Calver on notice that the state asserted that Raymond was
a qualified victim under I.C. § 18-4506(a), on the basis of either his joint custody,
or any other parental rights which arose from the custody order.

The jury

instructions likewise required the state to prove that Raymond was a qualified
victim.
Even assuming, arguendo, that any discrepancy between the language
used in the Information and the jury instruction constitutes a variance, Calver
has failed to carry her burden of establishing a variance of constitutional
significance that requires reversal.

Any variance in this case was clearly not

fatal because Calver has failed to show it deprived her of her right to fair notice,
left her open to the risk of double jeopardy, or constituted a constructive
amendment. See Jones, 140 Idaho at 49,89 P.3d at 889.
There is no indication in the record that, had Calver been provided the
notice she claims the instructions deprived her of, she would have conducted
her cross-examination of the state's witnesses any differently, or that she would
have presented a different defense or theory of her case at trial. There is also
no reasonable possibility that Calver could be subject to a second prosecution
for the same offense.

Finally, no variance in this case altered the charging

document to the extent Calver was tried for a crime of a greater degree or of a
different nature.

Because Calver has failed to show her constitutional rights

were violated by any variance, she has failed to satisfy the first element of Perry.
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not
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contained in the appel/ate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978
(footnote omitted). For the reasons discussed above, Calver cannot show plain
or obvious error.

Further, it is not clear from the appel/ate record that the

decision of her trial counsel to not object to the jury instructions was based on
ignorance of the law or other objective shortcomings, as opposed to being
merely a tactical decision.

Counsel may have deliberately chosen to forego

objecting for any number of reasons, including counsel's determination that any
variance was immaterial and did not prejudice Calver's ability to defend against
the charges.
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Calver to
"demonstrate that the error affected [her] substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. As previously indicated, a variance
affects the substantial rights of a defendant only "when it deprives the defendant
of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy."
Montoya, 140 Idaho at 165, 90 P.3d at 915 (citing Windsor, 110 Idaho at 41778, 716 P.2d 1189-90 (footnote omitted». For the reasons already explained,
Calver has failed to demonstrate that her substantial rights were affected by the
variance she claims for the first time on appeal and has, therefore, failed to
satisfy the final element of the Perry fundamental error analysis.
Calver has failed to demonstrate that the jury instructions created a fatal
variance with the Information. She has not shown how there was a constructive
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amendment or that she has been deprived of her right to fair notice, or that the
alleged variance leaves her open to the risk of double jeopardy.

This Court

should therefore affirm her conviction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Calver's conviction
for felony custodial interference.
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